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THE NLRB AND DEFERRAL TO AWARDS
OF ARBITRATION PANELS
Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) authorizes
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)' to prohibit
employers, employees and labor organizations from engaging in unfair
labor practices. An unfair labor practice is a violation of workers' or
employers' NLRA rights. The most frequently encountered unfair labor
practices are interference with the right of employees to engage in or
refrain from engaging in union activity,2 discriminatory employment
practices designed to encourage or discourage union activity, 3 and
refusals on the part of employers and employees to bargain collectively.'
To augment their statutory protection, employers, employees and
labor unions enter into collective bargaining agreements5 to protect
I The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) consists of five members appointed by
the President who serve staggered terms of five years each. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
2 Id. at §§ 157, 158(a)(1).
Id at § 158(a)(2).
Id at § 158(a)(5), (b)(3). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) gives
employees the right to engage in or refrain from union and other self-organizational activ-
ity. Id § 157. The NLRA proscribes the unfair labor practices enumerated in section 8. Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the NLRA prohibits employer actions designed to coerce or restrain
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by § 7 of the NLRA. Id § 158(a)(1). Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) prohibits employers from dominating, or interfering with the management of, a
union. I& § 158(a)(2). Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) are intended to insure the absolute in-
dependence of employee representatives in collective bargaining and to prevent the forma-
tion of company unions. See C. GREGORY & H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 231 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as GREGORY]. Section 8(a)(3) proscribes discriminatory practices designed
to encourage or discourage union membership. This section prevents employers from refus-
ing to hire, or from refusing to retain in employment any job applicant or employee because
of his existing membership in any labor organization, his desire to join a labor organization
or his refusal to join a particular union approved by the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1976). Section 8(a)(4) insures immunity from discriminatory treatment to employees who in-
voke the provisions of the NLRA against employers. The section proscribes the discharge
of employees who give testimony concerning or who file, unfair labor practice charges. Id at
§ 158(a)(4). Section 8(a)(5) requires employers to bargain collectively with employee
representatives. The section is not intended to compel an employer to enter into an agree-
ment with a union but merely requires an employer to meet and negotiate with the repre-
sentatives of his employees. IM at § 158(a)(b)(5); see GREGORY, supra at 231-33. See generally
F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY. LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 33-71 (1977)
[herinafter cited as BARTOSIC]. Section 8(b) of the NLRA proscribes unfair labor practices
on the part of unions which violate employees Section 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). Ex-
amples of § 8(b) violations include causing employers to discriminate against employees in
violation of § 8(a)(3), refusing to bargain collectively with employers, or levying excessive
membership dues. §§ 158(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5) (1976). See also GREGORY, supra at 231-33.
' Collective bargaining is defined in the NLRA as
... the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representa-
tive of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the ex-
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their respective interests. The subject matter of such agreements may
include union representation and recognition, management prerogatives,
compensation, working conditions, enforcement of the agreement, pro-
cedures for processing alleged violations of the agreement and duration
and termination clauses.' The same conduct may often violate both the
collective bargaining agreement and be a violation of section 7 of the
NLRA. For example, unilateral modification of a contract may be a viola-
tion of section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) of the NLRB and constitute a breach of the
labor contract.7 Also, a discriminatory discharge may violate both sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and a contract provision providing that an employee may be
discharged only for just cause.' Most collective bargaining agreements
provide for some type of grievance resolution mechanism to settle
disputes arising under the labor contract.' The aggrieved party can ob-
tain redress either by invoking the grievance arbitration process or by
filing an unfair labor practice charge"0 with the NLRB.Y
The preferred method of resolving disputes arising over the applica-
tion or interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is the dispute
ecution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
' See generally M. WORTMAN & C. RANDLE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES 68-90 (1966) [hereinafter cited as WORTMAN].
7 BARTOSIC. supra note 4, at 212-13.
Id. at 213.
' Where there is a long history of collective bargaining and an atmosphere of mutual
respect between company and union, any discontent or disatisfaction on the part of an
employee arising out of the employment relationship is likely to be subject to resolution
through the grievance settlement mechanism. For recently organized companies, however,
the collective bargaining agreements are usually very specific in regard to the types of
grievances which can be resolved through the dispute resolution process. Often this
category of grievances is limited to violations of specific terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. See WORTMAN, supra note 6, at 70.
"I Aggrieved parties initiate unfair labor practice charges by filing a written complaint
in the NLRB regional office located in the region where the alleged violation occurred. Un-
fair labor practice charges must be filed within six months of the alleged illegal act. If a
preliminary investigation discloses sufficient evidence to substantiate the charge, the
regional office first attempts a voluntary settlement of the dispute. If the dispute is not set-
tled, the Regional Director issues a notice of hearing and a complaint. A hearing concerning
the unfair labor practice charge takes place before an administrative law judge (formerly
known as a trial examiner). An NLRB attorney prosecutes the complaint against the alleged
offender. The proceeding before the administrative law judge is formal and the Federal
Rules of Evidence generally apply to the proceedings. At the conclusion of the hearing the
administrative law judge issues a written decision and opinion. The parties have twenty
days from the issuance of the administrative law judge's decision to file exceptions to the
decision with the Board. If no exceptions are filed, the Board adopts the decision. If excep-
tions are filed, the parties file supporting briefs, and the Board then issues a decision based
on the entire record. The Board seldom permits oral argument. NLRB decisions may be ap-
pealed to federal courts of appeal in the same manner as final decisions of most other ad-
ministrative agencies. BARTOSIC, supra note 4, at 15-17.
" Id- at 213.
NLRB
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settlement mechanism mutually agreed to by the parties, most notably
arbitration. 2 When an arbitration panel is used to settle a labor dispute,
the union and employer often appoint an equal number of panel members
who in turn choose the final members. 3 The finality of arbitral awards is
vital to the viability of the arbitral process as a means of dispute settle-
ment.'4 Thus, parties who appeal arbitral awards to the NLRB, on the
basis of relevant contract violations that are also alleged violations of
the NLRA detract from the efficiency of the arbitral process. To protect
the efficacy of arbitration, the Board will often defer to an arbitral
award to resolve a statutory charge.'5 In establishing the content of the
Board's policy of deferring to arbitration awards, however, the Board
must balance the tension between its duty to prevent unfair labor prac-
tices and the Board's desire to uphold the integrity of the arbitral
process.
6
The maintenance of arbitration as a desirable and final means of
dispute settlement necessitates a Board policy of maximum deference to
arbitration awards. 1 Most employers and employees prefer arbitration
as a means of dispute settlement. 8 The NLRA specifically provides that
arbitration is the preferred method of labor dispute settlement.'9 The
arbitral process is considerably less formal and less time consuming that
the Board's process for deciding unfair labor practice charges. ° The effi-
cacy of the arbitration process will be preserved only if the parties view
the arbitration proceeding as final. The main disadvantage to a Board
policy of absolute deference to arbitration is that deference occasionally
forces the Board to defer to grossly unfair arbitral awards."
" See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
, See F. ELKHOURI & E. ELKHOURI. How ARBITRATION WORKS 68-69, 204 (1973) [herein-
after cited as ELKHOURI]; M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 19-24 (1968).
" See Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 355, 358 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Atleson].
" Section 10(a) of the NLRA empowers the NLRB to prevent the unfair labor prac-
tices listed in § 8 of the NLRA which affect commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). This
statute, however, is written in permissive language and imposes no absolute duty or obliga-
tion on the NLRB to remedy unfair labor practices. Section 10(a) in effect gives the Board
power to delegate its authority to decide unfair labor practices to arbitrators where ap-
propriate. See GREGORY. supra note 4, at 440-41. Delegation of authority is now an accepted
practice on the part of federal administrative agencies and is seldom challenged in the
courts. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, §§ 9.01-.05-1 (1976).
," See International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1156
(1962), enf'd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 377 U.S. 1003
(1964).
" See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)
(federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts could
always review the merits of arbitral awards).
" See BARTOSIC. supra note 4, at 195.
" 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
" See GREGORY, supra note 4, at 513.
21 See text accompanying notes 54-68 infra.
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On the other hand, to protect statutory rights to the maximum ex-
tend possible, the Board should defer to arbitration proceedings only
where the arbitrator considered the statutory rights issue and decided
the issues the same as the Board would have decided them.22 In all other
cases, the Board should conduct hearings concerning the alleged unfair
labor practice charges. Even though the probability of the NLRB revers-
ing the arbitrator's award in a particular case may be slim, the losing
part might nevertheless appeal the arbitrator's award, especially if the
rights at stake are valuable or the monetary amount at risk in the case is
high.23 Under the limited deferral policy, arbitration might become a
vestigal and unnecessary step which parties would bypass in favor of im-
mediate filing of unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB.24 Since
neither a policy of limited deference nor a policy of absolute deference to
arbitral awards is optimal, the NLRB and the courts have struggled with
selecting the appropriate standard that balances the two extremes. In
Suburban Motor Freight,' the Board announced recently that it would
no longer defer to arbitration awards unless the parties had presented
the alleged statutory unfair labor practices to the arbitrator and the
arbitrator had expressly considered the charges.2"
The Board articulated its first clear standard for deferral to arbitral
awards' in Spielberg Manufacturing Company." The employer,
Spielberg Manufacturing Company (Spielberg), signed a contract with
the Luggage and Leather Workers Union after recognitional strike by
that union.' Spielberg refused to reinstate four members of the union
due to their alleged misconduct on the picket line. As a part of the
strike settlement agreement, the parties agreed to submit the deter-
mination of the four employees' status to arbitration. 1 The arbitration
panel found that the four employees were not entitled to rein-
statement.2 Dissatisfied with the arbitrator's decision, the union filed
See Atleson, supra note 14 at 367.
See Truesdale, Impact of the NLRB on Labor-Management Relations: The Tie that
Binds, 1980 LAB. L. DEv. 153, 170-71 (1980) (NLRB refusal to defer to arbitral awards under-
mines overall integrity of arbitral process).
24 In recent years, the number of cases appealed to both higher courts and to higher
echelons of administrative agencies has increased dramatically. Cases in which a large
monetary amount is at stake are the most likely candidates for appeal. However, the
number of appeals brought without regard to monetary considerations is increasing. Often
litigants are more concerned with winning than with net economic advantage. See
Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 579-80 (1974).
247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980).
Id. at - , 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
2 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1154.
Id. at 1081, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
1 Id. at 1084, 1087.
21 Id. at 1087.
1 Id. at 1081, 1088, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
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unfair labor practice charges against Spielberg, alleging that the com-
pany's failure to reinstate the four strikers violated section 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.' The trial examiner found
that the four were entitled to reinstatement2' The Board agreed with
the trial examiner's holding that as a matter of law, an arbitration award
does not bind the Board. 5 The Board ruled, however, that deference to
the arbitral award would best serve the policy of encouraging voluntary
settlement of labor disputes. The Board found that the proceedings were
fair and regular,8 all parties had agreed to be bound by the award, and
the decision of the arbitration panel was not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the NLRA.3 7 These three requirements for
NLRB deference to arbitral awards became known as the "Spielberg
doctrine."
See note 4 supra.
112 N.L.R.B. at 1081, 1092, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
Id. at 1081, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
The Intermediate Report contains some evidence that the arbitral proceeding in
Spielberg were not "fair and regular." For instance, one of the arbitrators stated that
before the arbitral proceedings began, a union representative told him that the proceedings
would be "more or less of a formality." 112 N.L.R.B. at 1087. After the proceeding ended, a
union representative told the four discharged employees that the sacrifice of their jobs had
been necessary to obtain recognition for the union. Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1081, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. A corollary to Spielberg doctrine is the Collyer doc-
trine. In Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, (1971), the Board held
that where a dispute involving unfair labor practice issues centers around the meaning and
terms of a collective bargaining contract, the Board will defer the entire dispute to arbitra-
tion prior to making a finding on the unfair labor practice charges. Id. at 842, 77 L.R.R.M. at
1937. Although the Collyer and Spielberg doctrines are similar, they are applicable to
distinctly different fact situations. Spielberg concerns deference after arbitration while Col-
lyer concerns deference before arbitration. See Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 869,
n.10, 98 L.R.R.M. 1320, 1323 n.10 (1978) (Truesdale, Member, concurring). When a breach of a
collective bargaining agreement is committed, the aggrieved party can file a grievance and
if necessary submit the dispute to arbitration. He can also file an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB, unless the adjudication of such a charge is precluded by the Collyer
doctrine. See text accompanying notes 5-15 supra for a discussion of arbitration. After an
unfair labor practice issue is resolved in arbitration, an aggrieved party can file an unfair
labor practice charge with the Board unless prohibited by either the Spielberg deference
doctrine, applicable to cases not involving discipline and discharge, or the Suburban Motor
Freight deference doctrine applicable to discipline and discharge cases. See text
accompanying notes 86-88 infra. An aggrieved party can also file an unfair labor practice
charge after initiation of arbitration but before the arbitrator has reached a decision, pro-
vided the prosecution of such a charge is not proscribed by the Collyer deferral doctrine.
See GREGORY, supra note 4, at 440-42.
Shortly after the Spielberg decision, the Supreme Court and NLRB greatly expanded
the scope of the Spielberg deferral doctrine. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957), the Court stated that agreements to arbitrate are specifically enforceable in
federal courts. Id. at 453. Recognizing that an arbitrator's expertise is superior to that of
"the ablest judge," the Court subsequently narrowed the scope of judicial review of arbitral
awards. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). In
apparent reaction to these decisions, the Board stated that it would not adjudicate unfair
labor practice claims arising from the same facts as arbitrated contract disputes unless the
arbitration proceedings were tained by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural ir-
[Vol. XXXVIII
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In Electronic Reproduction Services Corp.,' the Board greatly ex-
tended the Spielberg doctrine." In Electronic Reproduction, the dispute
centered around the company's layoff of three employees for reasons
regarded by the union as a pretext for anti-union discrimination. 0 The
company first maintained that the layoffs were part of a plan to go out of
business."' Subsequently, the company maintained that the layoffs were
the result of the company's attempt to economize. 2 The arbitrator found
that two of the three employees had been offered and declined work in
categories in which they had been previously employed, and therefore,
were not entitled to relief. The arbitrator found that the third employee,
whom the company had reemployed, had been laid off in violation of his
seniority rights, and therefore, was entitled to backpay for the period of
his layoff. 3 The arbitrator did not rule on the issue of pretextual
discharge and his award did not state whether the issue of pretext was
raised or litigated during the arbitral proceeding.44 The Board never-
theless sustained the arbitrator's award. The Board announced that in
discipline and discharge cases45 it would defer to arbitral awards where
the complainant did not present available evidence concerning the unfair
labor practices. 8 The Board stated, however, that it would make excep-
tions to the policy of absolute deferral where the complainant demon-
strated the existence of unusual circumstances or bona fide reasons for
the failure to introduce evidence of alleged unfair labor practices during
regularities. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 927, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1156. The Board
also indicated that arbitration proceedings are reviewable where the arbitration award was
clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at
927, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157. In later decisions, the Board refused to hear unfair labor practice
claims which were subject to an arbitration clause, regardless of whether the parties had
resorted to arbitration. Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561, 1562-63, 57 L.R.R.M. 1477, 1477
(1964); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431, 432, 53 L.R.R.M. 1070, 1070 (1963). Between 1960
and 1964, however, the Board deferred to arbitral awards in only a minority of cases involv-
ing unfair labor practice issues. See, e.g., Armco Drainage & Metal Prods. Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
1753, 1757-58, 50 L.R.R.M. 1502, 1503 (1962) (all parties subject to jurisdiction of arbitrator,
therefore, must use arbitration process to settle dispute); Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132
N.L.R.B. 1416, 1419-21, 48 L.R.R.M. 1524, 1526 (1961) (NLRB deferred to arbitral award in
employer discriminatory practice case despite allegations of procedural irregularities at
hearing).
" 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974).
* See text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
213 N.L.R.B. at 759, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1213-14. A layoff or discharge is pretextual when
a seemingly plausible and justifiable reason is given for the action, but the real reason
underlying the employer's action is anti-union bias. BARTOSIC, supra note 4, at 61-62.
" 213 N.L.R.B. at 778-79, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215.
42 Id. N.L.R.B. at 775, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1213.
Id. at 758, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1212.
" Id. at 759, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1213-14.
'" In Electronic Reproduction, the Board stated that in unfair labor practice cases
other than those involving employee discipline and discharge, it would continue to apply the
Spielberg deferral standard. Id. at 760-62, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1214-16.
48 Id. at 762, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216.
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arbitration proceedings. 7 The Board reasoned that a complainant would
undermine the arbitration process by filing a charge with the Board
alleging an unfair labor practice that could have been settled in the arbi-
tration proceeding.48 According to the Board, complainants who fear an
adverse ruling at arbitration could deliberately withhold evidence at
arbitration proceedings with the intent of obtaining a more favorable
decision from the NLRB in the event of an unfavorable arbitration
award.49 Disputants could also withhold information at arbitraton in hope
of inducing the opposing party to makd a favorable settlement of the
dispute before the case reached the hearing stage at the NLRB. Such
practices would damage the efficacy of the arbitral process." In Elec-
tronic Reproduction the dissenting members of the Board maintained
that Spielberg permitted the NLRB to defer to arbitration awards only
when the arbitrator actually decided the statutory rights at issue.2 The
dissent argued that the NLRB's vindication of the individual rights
guaranteed by the NLRA should be the NLRB's paramount concern and
should take precedence over the Board's concern with the viability of
arbitration as a quick and efficient means of settling labor disputes.'
" 213 N.L.R.B. at 762, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216. As examples of "unusual circumstances"
which would justify a refusal to defer to an arbitration award, the Board cited instances.
where an arbitration award applied to alleged unfair labor practices occurring after the
award, and instances where the arbitrator has specifically refused to rule on certain issues
because he considers them statutory as opposed to contractual issues. Deference is also im-
proper where both parties had specifically agreed that certain issued should not be
submitted to arbitration. Id.
Id. at 761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215.
4 Id. at 761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215.
See id. at 761-62, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1217-18.
s Id. at 752, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1218. In Electronic Reproduction, the Board reiterated that
it retained jurisdiction in cases to which it deferred to insure that arbitration fulfilled the
fundamental purposes of the NLRA. Id. at 764, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1218.
Id. at 765; 87 L.R.R.M. at 1219 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting). Adoption
of the dissent's position that the Board should defer to arbitral awards only where the arbi-
trator actually decided the statutory issues involved in the dispute would insure that all
alleged unfair labor practices are given full and fair consideration at either the Board or
arbitral level. See text accompanying notes 97-98 infra. The dissent implied that the Subur-
ban Motor Freight deferral doctrine the Board adopted later is an integral part of the
Spielberg deferral doctrine. See text accompanying notes 82-88 infra.
' The Electronic Reproduction dissent relied primarily on Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417
U.S. 12 (1973). Gardner-Denver involved the discharge of the plaintiff from employment
with the defendant for allegedly racially discriminatory reasons. 415 U.S. at 38-39. Although
the union contract contained an anti-racial discrimination clause, the plaintiff did not allege
that racial discrimination was the basis for his firing until his complaint had entered the
final pre-arbitration stage. Id at 39, 42-43. The arbitrator ruled that Alexander had been
discharged for just cause, but did not directly rule on Alexander's charge of racial
discrimination. Id. at 42-43.
Prior to the arbitration hearing, Alexander filed a complaint on the racial discrimina-
tion charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Following the arbitration
award, the Commission concluded that there was not reasonable cause to believe that Alex-
[Vol. XXXVIII
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Less than four years after the Electronic Reproduction decision, the
Board, in Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc.," began the gradual movement
away from the Electronic Reproduction doctrine.55 Mason and Dixon
ander had been fired for racially discriminatory reasons and issued a right to sue letter
which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private suit. Id.
Alexander then sued Gardner-Denver in federal district court. Id. at 43. His suit was
dismissed on grounds that his claim had previously been submitted to arbitration. Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971), affd 466 F.2d 1209
(10th Cir. 1972). 466 F.2d 1209, 1210 (10th Cir., 1972). The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that rights guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are individual rights, which indi-
viduals enforce chiefly in lawsuits in federal courts. 415 U.S. at 47-49. Arbitration, with its
considerable informality and lack of procedural safeguards, is not well suited to vindicate
important individual rights such as those guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Id. at 156-58. In dicta, the Court stated that arbitral decisions concerning NLRB rights not
subject to contractual abrogation do not preclude NLRB consideration of claims based on
the alleged violations of the same rights. Id. at 50. See 213 N.L.R.B. at 755, 87 L.R.R.M. at
1219.
Gardner-Denver, as interpreted by the dissent, stands for the proposition that
statutory rights should never be deferred to arbitration, even where there are congruent
arbitrable contractual issues. See 213 N.L.R.B. at 755, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1219. Statutory viola-
tions and violations of collective bargaining agreements are congruent if the same action is
a violation of both the collective bargaining agreement and the party's statutory rights
under the NLRA. See BARTOSIC, supra note 4, at 212-13. The dissent's interpretation of
Gardner-Denver, however, certainly goes beyond the Board's recent holdings as to the
deference given to arbitral awards when congruent statutory rights and contractual issues
are at stake. See text accompanying notes 83-88 infra.
William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1973), arose out of a
jurisdictional dispute between rival unions. The strike arose over a work assignment
dispute. 417 U.S. at 14-15. The Florida Supreme Court lifted an injunction against the strike
on grounds that the court had no jurisdiction over the matter because the strike was
arguably an unfair labor practice under 29 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(i)(D) and thus subject to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at 13-14, see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The Court remanded, and held that in jurisdictional disputes,
the statutory prohibition of strikes does not preempt suits to enforce no-strike provisions.
417 U.S. at 20. Since Arnold involved only a jurisdictional dispute and arguably did not in-
volve public rights, the Electronic Reproduction dissent felt that Arnold supported its posi-
tion that the Board is not pre-empted from exercising its jurisdiction under circumstances
where public rights guaranteed by NLRA are at stake. 213 N.L.R.B. at 768, 87 L.R.R.M. at
1219.
237 N.L.R.B. 6, 98 L.R.R.M. 1540 (1978).
An important precursor of the Board's move away from the Electronic Reproduc-
tion decision was Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 98 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1978). The
Board considered the propriety of Kansas City Star's recission of a collective bargaining
agreement in response to a strike of disputed origin. The dispute arose out of the transfer of
a union member to a lower paying job. Shortly after the transfer, the workers on the night
shift reported for work but refused to perform any work. Id. at 866, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1321.
The union maintained it was a wildcat strike. Since union leadership had not instigated the
strike, there was no violation of the no-strike clause contained in the union's collective
bargaining agreement. Therefore, the union felt Kansas City Star had no grounds for recis-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 870, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1325 (Fanning and
Jenkins, Members, concurring and dissenting). Management, on the other hand, contended
that the union leadership was primarily responsible for the strike, and therefore it had just
cause to rescind the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 869, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1324. The ar-
bitrator did not specifically rule on the legality of the contract recission in finding for Kan-
19811
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arguably presented an opportunity for the Board to apply the "unusual
circumstances" exception to the Electronic Reproduction doctrine.8 In-
stead, the Board relied solely on the Spielberg doctrine.57 Mason and Dixon
discharged a member of the Teamster's union, Harold Baer, ostensibly
because a substantial number of garnishments were filed against him."
Baer also filed many grievances in the course of his employment with
Mason and Dixon" and was a member of a dissident Teamster's group,
Teamsters for a Democratic Union. During the hearing before the ad-
ministrative law judge, 0 the parties' testimony provided strong
evidence that Baer was actually dismissed because he had filed the
substantial number of grievances. Although neither Baer nor his union
contested the dismissal on statutory grounds, evidence was available
that could have established that the union violated section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA." Because of the union's hostility toward the dissident movement
with which Baer was affiliated, both the union and Mason and Dixon
desired his dismissal." Despite Baer's failure to raise the unfair labor
sas City Star, Id. at 871, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1324. He did, however, find that the union was
primarily responsible for the work stoppage. Id. at 866-67, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1320-21. The ad-
ministrative law judge upheld the arbitrator's decision in favor of Kansas City Star on the
basis of the Electronic Reproduction deferral doctrine. Id. at 866 & n.2., 98 L.R.R.M. at
1321-22 & n.2. Although the Board affirmed the administrative law judge's decision, the
Board held that the administrative law judge's reliance on Electronic Reproduction was un-
warranted because deference to the arbitral award met the Spielberg standards. Id. at 867
& n.3, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1321-22 & n.3; see text accompanying notes 27-37 supra. The Board
stated that the arbitrator's finding that the union was primarily responsible for the strike
precluded a contrary result. Id. at 864 & n.3, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1321-22 & n.3. The dissent main-
tained that the evidence showed that the union was not responsible for the strike. Since the
arbitrator had not passed on the legality of the contract recission, deferral to the award was
inappropriate. Id. at 871, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1326-27 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissent-
ing).
" See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
5 See text accompanying notes 27-38 supra.
Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 6, 8. Baer contended that at the time of
the first garnishment, the Mason and Dixon terminal manager had said nothing to him
concerning possible disciplinary action. 237 N.L.R.B. at 12. Although further garnishments
had been filed against his salary, the terminal manager said nothing about them until after
Baer filed several grievances and became heavily involved in the activities of Teamsters for
a Democratic Union, a dissident Teamster's group. Id.
11 Id- at 7. Baer filed thirteen grievances during the first nine months of 1976, more
than any other employee at Mason and Dixon's Cleveland terminal. Id. at 78. The terminal
manager admitted that the filing of the grievances "bothered" him. Id. Baer was also a
leader of the opposition to proposed operational changes at Mason and Dixon's Cleveland
terminal which, if implemented, might have resulted in the loss of some union jobs at the
facility. 237 N.L.R.B. at 7, 11. The dismissal of employees in retaliation for their filing of
grievances violates § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA because the employer's action is a
violation of the employee's right to engage in concerted activity for purposes of "collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976); see note 4 supra.
'o See note 10 supra.
8 See note 4 supra.
See 237 N.L.R.B. at 11. Two days after Baer filed his final two grievances (both were
filed on the same day) a hearing was held in the terminal manager's office. In attendance
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practice issue during arbitraton, the administrative law judge found that
the application of Electronic Reproduction to the case would lead to an
unjust result. 3 Therefore, the judge applied the Spielberg doctrine and
found that the proceeding was not "fair and regular" and therefore
refused to defer to the arbitration proceeding.64 The NLRB adopted the
administrative law judge's decision. 5 The facts in Mason and Dixon
demonstrate the unjust results which could flow from indiscriminate
application of the Electronic Reproduction doctrine.
Mason and Dixon is significant because the decision clearly indicated
that the Board did not consider Electronic Reproduction to be as signifi-
cant and pervasive a deferral doctrine as the Spielberg doctrine. The
arbitration proceeding in Mason and Dixon was clearly not "fair and
regular," and therefore, the Board applied the Spielberg doctrine cor-
rectly and did not defer to the arbitration award. Under Electronic
Reproduction, however, the Board would have been required to defer to
the arbitrator's award in the absence of unusual circumstances. The
hostility of the union and the employer toward Baer clearly constituted
unusual circumstances within the meaning of the Electronic Reproduc-
tion doctrine. The Board's failure to follow Electronic Reproduction indi-
cates that at the time of the Mason and Dixon decision, the Board no
longer considered Electronic Reproduction strong or controlling prece-
dent."'
Although the NLRB has not often adhered to the doctrine of stare
decisis in regard to federal court labor law decisions, a Ninth Circuit
decision may have provided some of the impetus for the Board's move-
ment away from the Electronic Reproduction deferral doctrine in Mason
and Dixon and later decisions. In Stephenson v. NLRB, 9 the Ninth Cir-
were Baer, the terminal manager, a union steward and a union business agent. The
grievances filed by Baer and the garnishment against him were discussed. The terminal
manager then announced that he was terminating Baer's employment. The two other union
members present apparently acquiesced. Baer believed that his replacement was already
present at the terminal when the hearing took place. Id.
I Id. See at 12 n.33. Mason and Dixon's counsel strongly urged application of the Elec-
tronic Reproduction doctrine in Mason and Dixon, but the administrative law judge
declined to apply the doctrine. See id. at 13 n.37.
237 N.L.R.B. at 12-13.
Id. at 6. The Board specifically stated that the arbitration award did not meet the
Spielberg standards deferral, and did not mention the Electronic Reproduction doctrine in
its order affirming the administrative law judge's decision. Id. at 6 n.2.
See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
In a note to the Mason and Dixon decision, the NLRB implied that the adminis-
trative law judge should not have mentioned Electronic Reproduction in his decision
because Spielberg afforded complete grounds for disposition of the case. 237 N.L.R.B. at 6
n.2.
69 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977). In Stephenson, the complainant took a job with an
employer who was a party to a union collective bargaining agreement covering
Stephenson's job. Fikse Bros., Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1301, 1303, 90 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1355 (1975),
rev'd, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977). Stephenson did not become aware of the agreement until
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cuit stated that Electronic Reproduction represents an unwarranted ex-
tension of the NLRB's deferral policy." The court maintained that the
Board had abdicated its duty to consider unfair labor practices where
the Board deferred to the arbitration proceeding even though the arbi-
trator did not consider the unfair labor practice charge.71 The court ar-
ticulated a five-pronged test for determining the circumstances under
which the Board should defer to arbitral awards. Part one of the
Stephenson test requires the Board to consider the original three
Speilberg criteria: whether the arbitral proceedings were fair and
regular, whether the parties agreed to be bound by the award, and
whether the arbitral award was not clearly repugnant to the purposes of
the NLRA 2 In addition, the Stephenson test inquires whether the arbi-
tral panel had clearly decided the unfair labor practice issue to which the
party seeks the NLRB's deference and whether the arbitral tribunal
decided only issues within its competence. 3 The Stephenson court stated
that the competence requirement is fulfilled if the arbitration panel
three months after he began working for the respondent. Upon becoming aware of the
agreement, he immediately joined the union. He was later refused time off from work to
visit a union business agent and prohibited from drinking coffee on the job. Also, the com-
pany no longer provided Stephenson with free coveralls. Id. at 1303-04, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1355.
He was eventually dismissed for no apparent legitimate cause. The arbitration panel subse-
quently offered Stephenson reinstatement and awarded him $250 as compensation for lost
wages for the two months between the date of his dismissal and the effective date of the
arbitration award. Id. at 1304, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1354. During the first month of his original
employment with Fikse Bros., however, Stephenson was paid only $3.50 an hour instead of
the union rate of $5.07 per hour. Stephenson's NLRB complaint was founded on his claim for
$1,800 as compensation for the difference union and non-union wages during this period. He
also alleged that the changes in the respondent's attitude toward him following his joining
the union constituted discriminatory anti-union activity. Id.
The Board maintained that the sole claim involved was the adequacy of the lump sum
arbitral award. The Board stated that the policies of the NLRA would not be furthered by
the Board's adjudicating a dispute as to the amount of such an award. Id. at 1301, 90
L.R.R.M. at 1354-55. The Board maintained that it need not rely on the Electronic Repro-
duction doctrine since the controversy focused solely on the adequacy of the cash award in
the arbitral proceedings and not on the panel's failure to consider any statutory unfair labor
practice issues. Id. 90 L.R.R.M. at 1354. Member Fanning, in his dissent, maintained that
the Board had indeed relied on Electronic Reproduction in reaching its decision. Id., 90
L.R.R.M. at 1355 (Fanning, Member, dissenting). The Stephenson court agreed that the
Board had indeed relied on Electronic Reproduction in its decision. Stephenson v. NLRB,
550 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1977).
" 550 F.2d at 541. Although the Board did not expressly rely on Electronic Reproduc-
tion in Fikse, the court apparently felt that Electronic Reproduction provided the basis for
the Board's decision. Id. Thus, the Stephenson court's discussion of Electronic Reproduction
is an integral part of the decision and not dicta.
" 550 F.2d at 539-40.
Id at 537-38; see text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
550 F.2d at 538; Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Banyard, the
D.C. Circuit first appended the requirements that the arbitrator must have decided clearly
the unfair labor issue and that the arbitrator must have decided only issues within his com-
petence to the Spielberg deferral doctrine. Id.
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decided issues which are within its presumed expertise. 4 In establishing
a competency requirement, the court probably sought to differentiate
between instances where the arbitrator's presumed knowledge of the
"4common law of the shop" is crucial to the decision and instances where
the Board's expertise in the interpretation of the provisions of the
NLRA is of primary importance to the decision. 5
Max Factor and Company8 accorded the Board its first post-
Stephenson opportunity to apply the Electronic Reproduction deferral
doctrine. All unfair labor practice issues had apparently been presented
to arbitration.7 The arbitrator, however, did not rule on the unfair labor
practice aspects of the complainant's suspension and discharge.78 In
refusing to defer to the arbitrator's award, the Board stated that failure
of the arbitrator to consider unfair labor practice charges resulted in an
arbitration award which is repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
NLRA within the meaning of the Spielberg deferral doctrine.79 The
Board did not mention the Electronic Reproduction decision in the text
of its opinion, but instead cited Stephenson for the proposition that the
Board should not defer where the arbitrator has not considered the
statutory issues." Thus, in Max Factor the Board incorporated into the
"clearly repugnant" portion of the Spielberg deferral doctrine the
criteria of the Stephenson test which requires that the Board not defer
to the arbitral awards where the statutory issues involved have not
been clearly considered. Although Max Factor implicitly overruled Elec-
tronic Reproduction," the Board did not expressly overrule Electronic
Reproduction until almost a year and a half later, when it issued the
Suburban Motor Freight" decision.
Suburban Motor Freight involved the reprimand and discharge in
April and June of 1978 of the complainant, Ralph Singleton, a truck-
driver and dockman for Suburban. 3 He was reinstated with reduced
punishment pursuant to the local joint grievance committee's arbitral
awards. Subsequently, Singleton filed a complaint with the NLRB alleg-
ing that he had been disciplined for discriminatory, anti-union reasons, in
7' 550 F.2d at 540.
7' Arbitrators are presumably chosen because their knowledge of the "common law of
the shop"-the customs and practices of a particular plant or industry-is usually far
superior to that of an individual who has had no significant contact with the plant or in-
dustry in question. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 579-80 (1960).
76 239 N.L.R.B. 804, 100 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1978).
Id at 804, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1023.
78 Id.
71 Id.; see text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
239 N.L.R.B. at 804 n.3, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1023 n.3.
" See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980).
Id- at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
247 N.L.R.B. at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114; see note 4 supra. Section 8(a)(1) of the
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violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA." Neither Singleton
nor his union raised the discriminatory discharge issue during the two
arbitration proceedings. 5 The Board held that Singleton's failure to
raise the discriminatory discharge issue during arbitration was not a bar
to his filing an 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice charge. 6 In overruling Elec-
tronic Reproduction, the Board announced that it would no longer defer
to an award which does not contain an indication that the arbitrator
ruled on the unfair labor practices." The party seeking the Board's
deferral to an arbitration award now has the burden of proving the
litigation of the unfair labor practice issue before the arbitrator.'
Member Penello entered a strong dissent and maintained that the
Board should, in discipline and discharge cases, adhere to the deferral
standard of Electronic Reproduction." He stated that permitting the
avoidance of unfavorable arbitration awards through relitigation of the
same facts at the Board will impede the Board's policy of encouraging
the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes." Penello maintained that
the "unusual circumstances" exception91 of Electronic Reproduction
would permit complainants to present any legitimate reasons for failure
to introduce evidence of unfair labor practices at arbitral proceedings,
thus mitigating the seemingly harsh results of Electronic
Reproduction.92 The dissent predicted that the majority decision would
ultimately result in greatly decreased reliance on arbitration pro-
ceedings." Victims of alleged discriminatory actions proscribed by sec-
tion 8(a)(3) would have no choice but to file a complaint with the Board. 4
The dissent also argued that the majority's decision would greatly in-
NLRA is a catch-all section which proscribes any activity which interferes with the rights of
employees to complete freedom of self-organization guaranteed by § 7. Section 8(a)(3) is a
more specific provision, dealing with discriminatory hiring and discharges which are
designed to encourage or discourage union membership. Most employer actions which are
proscribed by § 8(a)(3) are also proscribed by § 8(a)(1). See BARTOSIC, supra note 4, at 59-60.
247 N.L.R.B. at - , 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
8Id.
"7 Id. See Airco Industrial Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467, 1972. The Board
originally articulated the doctrine that it will not defer to arbitration awards where the
arbitrator has not specifically ruled on the unfair labor practice charges in Airco. Id at 677,
79 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
88 247 N.L.R.B. at __, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114. See Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B.
928, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972). In Yourga, the Board first stated that the party seeking
deference to an arbitration award has the burden of proving that the unfair labor practice
issue was litigated before the arbitrator. Id. at 928, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
247 N.L.R.B. at - , 103 L.R.R.M. at 114-16 (Penello, Member, dissenting).
Id. at 1115.
, See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
92 47 N.L.R.B. -at __., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1115-16; see text accompanying notes 28-35
supra.
's 247 N.L.R.B. at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1115-16. See text accompanying notes 17-21
supra.
" 247 N.L.R.B. at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1115-16.
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crease the Board's caseload, making the resolution of unfair labor prac-
tice charges more time-consuming than at present. 5
Despite the arguments of the dissent, Suburban Motor Freight
represents a proper accommodation between the conflicting goals of in-
suring both that the NLRB protect the statutory rights of workers and
employers" and that the NLRB preserve the efficacy of arbitration as a
means of settling labor disputes. 7 The requirement that the Board defer
only to arbitral awards containing explicit rulings on statutory rights
issues will insure that all issues involving such rights are fully and fairly
considered at either the arbitral or NLRB level. Furthermore, in-
dividuals that have just cause for failing to present contractual
grievances involving statutory rights to arbitration will now be able to
file unfair labor practice charges with the Board. Thus, the Suburban
Motor Freight doctrine guarantees that individuals who through no fault
of their own fail to submit statutory rights issues to arbitral panels will
not be unjustly penalized for their failure to do so. 8 The efficacy of the
arbitral process will be preserved under the Suburban Motor Freight
test because in many disputes both sides will undoubtedly continue to
submit all issues to arbitration, especially in the more routine types of
cases where the monetary amount involved is small and the case
establishes no important precedent in regard to intra-plant labor rela-
tions. 9 In minor cases, both parties have strong incentives to settle the
dispute in an arbitration proceeding because both the time and money
expended in having the case resolved by the NLRB will not be
justified."'
The Board can deal with abuse of the Suburban Motor Freight doc-
trine"1 through use of the power of administrative law judges to grant
motions for summary judgment. The administrative law judge, upon re-
quest of a party to the proceeding or upon his own motion, could sum-
marily dismiss an unfair labor practice charge where abuse of the
" Id. at - , 103 L.R.R.M. at 1115-16. Member Penello specifically stated that the
Board should retain the Electronic Reproduction deferral doctrine. Id at -, 103 L.R.R.M.
at 1116 (Penello, Member, dissenting). Penello's assertion that the Suburban Motor Freight
doctrine will make arbitration more time consuming than at present is questionable. See
text accompanying notes 102-03 infra.
See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
See text accompanying notes 6-11 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
Although the number of court and administrative decisions appealed has increased
dramatically in recent years, the majority of decisions still are not appealed. See P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 51,
56 (1973).
" Complainants do not incur any expense in the prosecution of unfair labor practice
charges before the N.L.R.B. Respondents, however, must bear the cost of their defense. See
BARTOSIC, supra note 4, at 15-16. In arbitration, the matter is settled at a single formal
proceeding, while pursuing an unfair labor practice charge through the various formal and
informal levels of NLRB adjudication is obviously more time consuming. See id. at 193-95.
... See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
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Board's deferral policy is apparent. ' A common example of abuse of the
Suburban Motor Freight doctrine is where one party deliberately
withholds information at the arbitral level in hope of obtaining a more
favorable award in NLRB proceedings. If the party failing to submit the
unfair labor practice charge to arbitration had no plausible reason for his
failure to do so and the unfair labor practice charge was congruent with
an arbitrable grievance arising under a collective bargaining agreement,
the administrative law judge could summarily dismiss the unfair labor
practice charge. Whether a particular course of conduct constituted an
abuse of the Board's restricted deferral policy would be a question of
fact to be determined by the NLRB in the same manner as other factual
issues. The deferral test which the NLRB articulated in Suburban Motor
Freight, coupled with a judicious use of the Board's power to dismiss un-
fair labor practices charges' 3 to prevent abuse of the deferral doctrine,
will establish a fair and feasible standard for NLRB deferral to arbitral
awards based on violations of statutory rights of workers and
employers.
JOHN E. GREGORICH
"0 All courts and administrative tribunals have the prerogative of dismissing cases
summarily for just cause without constitutionally violating the parties' right to be heard.
See Gellhorn & Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 612, 613-15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn]. The N.L.R.B. regulations provide
specifically for summary judgment in NLRB proceedings. 29 C.F.R. § 102.24 (1980).
Summary judgment may be entered in order to penalize a party for violation of an agency
policy, even though the party making the motion for summary judgment is not entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Gellhorn, supra at 630. Apparently the only case
specifically dealing with the exercise of summary judgment by the NLRB is Liquid Car-
bonic Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 795, 795, 38 L.R.R.M. 1361, 1362 (1956), holding that summary
judgments by the NLRB do not violate the fifth amendment right to be heard.
03 The Board's power to dismiss unfair labor practice charges is sometimes referred to
as the Board's power to decline the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular case. See Stephen-
son v. N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 535, 541 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977).
